Device-to-device (D2D) communications have recently attracted much attention for the potential capability to improve spectral efficiency (SE) underlaying the existing heterogeneous networks (HetNets). Due to no sophisticated control, D2D-worked user equipments (DUEs) themselves cannot resist eavesdropping or security attacks. It is urgent to maximize the secure capacity for both cellular users and DUEs. This paper formulates the radio resource-allocation problem to maximize the secure capacity of DUEs for D2D communication underlaying HetNets, which consist of high-power nodes (HPNs) and low-power nodes (LPNs). The optimization objective function with transmit bit rate and power constraints, which is nonconvex and hard to directly derive, is first transformed into a matrix form. Then, the equivalent convex form of the optimization problem is derived according to Perron-Frobenius theory. A heuristic iterative algorithm based on the proximal theory is proposed to solve this equivalent convex problem through evaluating the proximal operator of the Lagrange function. Numerical results show that the proposed radio resource-allocation solution significantly improves the secure capacity with a fast convergence speed.
I. INTRODUCTION
H ETEROGENEOUS networks (HetNets), which are expected to significantly improve capacity and extend coverage, have been widely applied to support the explosive growth of data traffic [1] . A HetNet uses a mixture of high-power nodes (HPNs) (e.g., macro or micro base stations (BSs)) and lowpower nodes (LPNs) (e.g., picocell BSs, femtocell BSs, smallcell BSs, wireless relay, or distributed antennas) in the same coverage. HPNs are deployed to provide seamless connectivity and guarantee the basic quality-of-service (QoS) requirements of user equipments (UEs). Since the transmit power of HPNs is sufficiently high to achieve seamless coverage, all UEs often access the HPN to obtain the control signaling of the whole HetNet, which fulfills decoupling of control and user planes [2] . In some hot spots with huge value of packet traffic, a UE prefers to access LPNs rather than HPNs because LPNs can provide much higher capacity than the HPN. Therefore, the dense deployment of LPNs increases spectral efficiency (SE) and is one of the key factors for boosting the capacity of the future network [3] . However, although the HetNet is a good alternative to improve SE with seamless coverage, the intertier interference between HPNs and LPNs is severe, and the backhaul is often constrained because UEs have to connect with the core network with a high capacity requirement [4] . To alleviate the heavy load on backhaul, several alternative approaches have been presented. In particular, a hierarchical cloud computing architecture is proposed in [5] through adding a mobile dynamic cloud.
To alleviate the heavy burden on the backhaul and improve SE in HetNets, device-to-device (D2D) communication, which is defined as direct communication between UEs without passing through BSs, has been proposed in the Third-Generation Partnership Project Long-Term Evolution-Advanced [6] . With more traffic being transmitted by D2D communication, information exchange between UEs and the core network is abated [7] . Recently, D2D communication has attracted much attention with the ever-increasing demand for the local content exchange between two nearby UEs. In D2D underlaying HetNets, radio resource is typically reused between the direct D2D link and the cellular air access link. As a result, the intertier interference is critical to make D2D communication rollout. Many works have been done to improve SE for the D2D communication underlaying HetNets. In [8] , D2D communications are shown to effectively improve the total throughput without generating 0018-9545 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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harmful interference to HetNets with proper management.
Other recent research studies [9] , [10] have verified that the D2D communication underlaying HetNets have several advantages, including high spectral utilization, low energy consumption, and incurring new packet services. To improve SE, the resource allocation should be optimized for D2D communication underlaying HetNets, which is a nonconvex optimization problem. The nonconvex optimization problem has been extensively researched, in which the Lagrangian dual method has been widely used [11] , [12] . However, it is assumed that the interference from cellular users to D2D users is constant in [11] , and the intertier interference between cellular users and D2D users is replaced by the maximum allowed noise in [12] . These assumptions simplify the problem and cannot achieve the best performance. To tackle this problem, a new optimization method should be applied for D2D communication underlaying HetNets. Meanwhile, to enhance the security of wireless transmission, physical-layer security has been developed based on information theoretic concepts [13] - [15] . Physical-layer security, which exploits the physical characteristics of wireless channel to enhance security, has significantly influenced the wireless communication because there exists secured data transmission between power nodes and the eavesdropper [13] . To avoid the information from power nodes to UEs from being leaked, the data rate of eavesdroppers should be maintained at a low level.
With a more open control plane, D2D UE is more vulnerable to the attacks of eavesdroppers. There have been some studies to improve the secure capacity of D2D underlaying systems from the viewpoint of physical-layer security. In [16] , two secure capacity optimization problems for a multiple-input-multipleoutput secrecy channel with multiple D2D communications are researched, and two conservative approximation approaches to convert the probability-based constraints into the deterministic constraint have been addressed. Furthermore, the radio resource allocation as a matching problem in a weighted bipartite graph has been formulated in [17] , in which the Kuhn-Munkres algorithm to obtain the optimal solution is proposed. However, the D2D communication only helps improve the secure capacity of cellular UEs by confusing the eavesdroppers in both [16] and [17] . In other words, the D2D communication acts as a kind of interference against eavesdropping when an eavesdropper tries to overhear the cellular communication; therefore, the available rate of the eavesdropper is lessened [18] . To our best knowledge, there have been few publications to optimize the secure capacity of both cellular UEs and D2D links. In particular, few works maximize the secure capacity of the D2D communication underlaying HetNets. Note that such secure capacity optimization problem is nonconvex and hard to be directly solved because of the existence of intertier and intratier interference.
The goal of this paper is to optimize the radio resource allocation aiming to maximize the secure capacity of D2D communication underlaying HetNets. The nonconvex objective function with several constraints is first transformed into a matrix form. Then, the equivalent convex form is derived according to the Perron-Frobenius theory, which is based on the eigenvalue and eigenvector [19] . Note that the Perron-Frobenius theory has been mainly used in homogeneous networks; there are lack of publications to use this theory to address the optimization issue in the D2D communication underlaying HetNets. To derive this Perron-Frobenius theory-based equivalent convex optimization problem, the corresponding Lagrange function has been formulated, and the proximal operator has been evaluated. Finally, a novel iterative algorithm based on the proximal theory has been proposed. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
• The optimization problem of radio resource allocation aiming to maximize the secure capacity in D2D communication underlaying HetNets has been addressed in this paper. To our best knowledge, previous works mainly take D2D communication as a friendly jammer to improve the secure capacity of cellular users. Thus, only the performance of cellular users is optimized, and the performance of D2D communication is ignored. Furthermore, previous works mainly focus on the traditional SE and do not focus on the secure capacity. In addition, when solving the optimization problem, previous works mainly try to simplify the interference between cellular users and D2D users by setting the interference with constant, which cannot take full advantage of the benefit of subcarrier reusing. This paper explores the resource-allocation scheme for both cellular users and D2D users when they share the same subcarrier resource to maximize the secure capacity of D2D communication underlaying HetNets. • To deal with the secrecy-optimized resource-allocation problem, a nonconvex objective function has been formulated. This nonconvex objective function is hard to be directly derived. The existing works often simplify the interference into constant, and then, the Lagrangian dual theory can be used. However, the interference in the D2D underlaying HetNets is often dynamical and should not be regarded as constant. To deal with this nonconvex issue, the objective function is transformed to an equivalent convex optimization problem according to the Perron-Frobenius theory. Furthermore, to solve the equivalent convex problem, an iterative algorithm based on the proximal theory consisting of both outer and inner loop optimizations has been proposed to achieve the global optimal solution. • The SE performance of the proposed resource-allocation solution has been numerically evaluated. Simulation results show that the proposed iterative algorithm can promptly converge and outperforms the baseline algorithms. The effects of the QoS and power constraints with various other comparisons have been shown to evaluate the performance gains of the proposals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system model of D2D communication underlaying HetNets will be described and the optimization problem will be formulated. The solution to the optimization problem and the corresponding iterative algorithm will be presented in Section III. Section IV will provide simulations to verify the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm and the corresponding solutions. Finally, this paper will be concluded in Section V. The closed access means that each cell can only schedule the UEs that belong to it, whereas the open access means that one cell can schedule any UE as long as the reference signal receiving power is sufficiently high. Similar assumption can be found in previous works [20] . Under the closed access, UEs monopolize their own serving cells and the privacy and security of the communication can be guaranteed, although the performance of the closed access is worse than the performance of the open access. Since this paper focuses on the secure capacity, the closed access is only considered. Let H denote the average number of HPN-accessed UEs (HUEs) in each HPN and M denote the average number of LPN-accessed UEs (LUEs) in each LPN, respectively. In addition, K D2Dworked UEs (DUEs) coexist with LUEs in each LPN. It is assumed that all UEs (e.g., HUEs, LUEs, or DUEs) have low mobility so that the channel state information (CSI) between UEs and power nodes and the CSI between the transmitter and the receiver of any D2D user pair remain stationary [21] . Therefore, subcarriers can be assumed to be independent from each other, and the channel fading of each subcarrier can be assumed the same within a time slot but may vary cross different subcarriers. On each subcarrier, there exists an eavesdropper that leverages the information on the desired UEs. Since DUEs prefer to share the uplink radio resources with HUEs or LUEs to avoid severe intertier interference, this paper only focuses on the resource allocation to optimize the secure capacity in uplink. The notations in this paper are summarized in Table I In orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access (OFDMA)based wireless networks, a BS allocates orthogonal subcarriers to different users. Thus, in each cell (e.g., an HPN or an LPN), each subcarrier can be allocated to only one cellular UE or a DUE pair [22] , but one or more subcarriers can be allocated to the same cellular UE or a DUE pair. It means that, at most, one element of (p H h1 , p H h2 , . . . , p H hN ) is positive and that the others are all zero. Let α H hn , α L lmn , α D lkn ∈ {0, 1} denote the allocation index of subcarriers, which suggests whether the nth subcarrier is allocated to the hth HUE, the mth LUE of the lth LPN, and the kth DUE pair of the lth LPN or not, respectively. It should be noted that eavesdroppers are passive and will not share their CSI with the HPN or LPN. In fact, if eavesdroppers keep silent all the time, it is impossible for the network to estimate their CSI. However, when eavesdroppers become active, they can be detected by the network [23] . Thus, in this paper, the CSI of eavesdroppers is assumed to be known, and similar assumption can be found in previous works [24] .
The uplink signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) from the hth HUE to the HPN on the nth subcarrier ρ H hn can be expressed as
The uplink SINR from the hth HUE to the eavesdropper on the nth subcarrier ρ HE hn can be expressed as
The uplink SINR from the mth LUE of the lth LPN to the lth LPN on the nth subcarrier ρ L lmn can be expressed as
where I L lmn denotes the interference and is expressed as
The uplink SINR from the lth LPN to the eavesdropper on the nth subcarrier ρ LE lmn can be expressed as
where I LE lmn denotes the interference and is expressed as
The uplink SINR from the transmitter of the kth DUE pair of the lth LPN to the receiver of the kth DUE pair of the lth LPN on the nth subcarrier ρ D lkn can be expressed as
where I D lkn denotes the interference and is expressed as
Similarly, the uplink SINR from the transmitter of the kth DUE pair of the lth LPN to the eavesdropper ρ DE lkn can be expressed as
where I DE lkn denotes the interference and is expressed as
Let C HS hn , C LS lmn , and C DS lkn denote the secrecy capacity of the hth HUE, the mth LUE of the lth LPN, and the kth DUE pair of the l the LPN, respectively. Accordingly, C HS hn , C LS lmn , and C DS lkn can be expressed as
respectively. Therefore, the secrecy capacity of the D2D communication underlaying HetNets can be written as
It is assumed that the secrecy capacity of each UE should be no less than the predefined threshold to guarantee QoS. Meanwhile, to save energy consumption, the maximum allowed transmit power of each power node is limited. In addition, the subcarrier-allocation index should be restricted to prevent the same subcarrier from being allocated to more than one UE of the same type, e.g., HUEs, LUEs, and DUEs. As a result, the secrecy-optimized resource-allocation problem for the D2D communication underlaying HetNets can be formulated with the QoS and transmit power constraints.
Problem 1 (Secrecy Capacity Optimization): With the constraints on the required QoS and maximum transmit power allowance, the secrecy-optimized resource-allocation problem for the D2D communication underlaying HetNets can be formulated as
where the constraints (16) 
III. SECRECY-OPTIMIZED RESOURCE-ALLOCATION OPTIMIZATION
Joint optimization of subcarriers and transmit power is an intractable problem [10] , and the optimization problem (15) with constraints (16)-(24) listed in Section II is nondeterministic polynomial (NP)-hard, which is impossible to be directly solved. However, it is noted that, under any given subcarrier-allocation policy, problem (15) can be transformed to a convex form according to the Perron-Frobenius theory. Thus, if we solve the equivalent convex problem for every possible subcarrierallocation policy, the global optimal solution can be derived. However, such exhaustive method with high complexity is hard to be practical. In this paper, we solve this transformed convex optimization problem with two steps. In the first step, we propose a suboptimal algorithm to allocate each user with proper subcarriers. In the second step, we design an optimal powerallocation scheme under the subcarrier-allocation policy proposed in the first step. A similar method to tackle the NP-hard problem has been used in previous works [21] . Based on the proposed subcarrier-allocation solution, it can be demonstrated that the optimization problem (15) can be completely solved through proposing the optimal power-allocation solution.
A. Subcarrier Allocation
Here, a subcarrier-allocation scheme is derived to solve problem (15) . Note that the subcarrier-allocation index is a discrete variable, and for any given subcarrier-allocation scheme, the optimal power allocation is independent from the subcarrierallocation results. Therefore, the following theorem can be held.
Theorem 1: For any optimization problem max {x,y} f (x, y), where x ∈ N 1×X is a finite discrete variable vector and each element of x is one of S integer values. y ∈ R 1×Y is a continuous variable. X, S, and Y are positive integers. Let x i denote the ith feasible solution of x, where x * is the optimal, x and y * i denote the optimal y under x i , and 1 ≤ i ≤ X S . Therefore, x * can be expressed as
Proof: See Appendix A. According to Theorem 1, let x denote the subcarrierallocation scheme and y denote the transmit power-allocation scheme, the optimal subcarrier-allocation scheme can be directly derived with exhaustive method. However, such exhaustive method is impractical because each subcarrier needs to be searched to derive the optimal subcarrier allocation, which results in high complexity. Here, a suboptimal subcarrierallocation scheme is proposed to optimize the capacity of each cell (e.g., HPNs or LPNs), which can be expressed as 
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. According to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition, the optimal subcarrier-allocation scheme to maximize the data rate of HPNs can be expressed as
Initialize the Lagrange multiplier and then use the subgradientbased method [25] to search for the subcarrier-allocation scheme. The proposed algorithm is executed in each cell (e.g., HPNs or LPNs) to achieve good performance. In the whole network composed of multiple HPNs, this proposal can work efficiently in each HPN; thus, the overall performance can be optimized.
B. Power-Allocation Scheme
Here, based on the aforementioned subcarrier allocation, the power allocation to solve problem (15) is researched. Problem (15) can be rewritten as
In OFDMA-based wireless networks, the interference between any two different subcarriers can be ignored due to the orthogonal characteristics. Therefore, the primal objective function can be divided into N independent subproblems, which indicates that the primal problem can be derived by solving the N subproblems. The nth subproblem optimization can be given as
Note that (33) is still nonconvex due to the intertier interference. To transform it into a convex form, the uplink CSI vector of the hth HUE on the nth subcarrier, which represents the CSI from the hth HUE to the HPN, from the hth HUE to LPNs, and from the hth HUE to the receiver of other DUEs that share the nth subcarrier, is given by 
where h, k, l ∈ {h, l|∃h, k, lα H hn , α L lmn , α D lkn = 0}. Combine these three CSI vectors G H hn , G L l , and G D l together, it can be derived that, on the nth subcarrier, the CSI matrix among all users on the nth subcarrier can be expressed as
(43) Similarly, the CSI between users and the eavesdropper on the nth subcarrier is given by
Note that, for a given subcarrier-allocation scheme, G n and G E n are fixed, which means that the number of users (HUE, LUE, and DUE) on the nth subcarrier is determined and the CSI matrix can be known. Without loss of generality, let G n be a J × J matrix, which indicates that the number of users on the nth channel is J, and let G E n be a J × 1 vector. The transmit power matrix of the J users is given by p n . A nonnegative matrix is defined F n with entries
and the vector v n = (σ 2 /(G n ) 11 , σ 2 /(G n ) 22 , . . . , (σ 2 / (G n ) JJ )) T . Now, the SINR of the jth user in the uplink is (S n ) j = p nj /(F n p n + v n ) j , and its corresponding capacity can be expressed as
Similarly, we can have
Now, the SINR of the jth user in the wiretap channel can be expressed as (S E n ) j = p nj /(F E n p n + v E n ) j , and the data rate is
where C S min and p max are the minimum secrecy data rate and maximum transmit power constraints, respectively. Due to the intertier interference, the optimization problem in (48) is still hard to be derived. To solve this problem, we can define the vector α j as
and the constraint (50) can be expressed as
To transfer the constraint (50), we can have the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let
then constraint (50) is equal to
Proof: See Appendix B. Based on Theorem 2, the optimization problem in (48) can be transformed to
Obviously, the objective function (59) has been transferred to be linear. However, this optimization problem is still nonconvex because of the nonconvex constraints (61) and (62). These two constraints can be transformed into a convex form by using the following theorem. 
where ρ(·) is the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue of a nonnegative matrix.
Proof: See Appendix C. Due to the log-convexity property of the Perron-Frobenius eigenvalue, constraints (65) and (66) are convex. Now, the concerned optimization problem in (59) is a convex optimization problem and can be solved in polynomial time. However, such problem is very hard to solve by the traditional subgradient convex optimization method because it is difficult to get the closedform expressions of C n and C E n , which is essential to achieve the solution. To deal with this challenge, a novel method that is effective for this problem is proposed in the following content.
The Lagrangian function of problem (63) can be expressed as
where λ, β, μ are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints. Then, the Lagrangian dual function can be expressed as
Therefore, the dual optimization problem can be formulated as Since the optimization problem in (63) is convex, the duality gap between the primal problem and its dual problem is zero, which shows that the primal problem can be solved by solving its dual problem (69). The subgradient-based method can be utilized to solve (69) and the subgradient of the Lagrange multipliers in the dual function in the ith iteration can be written as
) j are the capacity and the leakage capacity of the jth UE on the nth subcarrier in the ith iteration, respectively. ∇λ (i+1) (j), ∇β (i+1) (j), and ∇μ (i+1) (j) denote the jth subgradient corresponding to λ, β, and μ utilized in the (i + 1)th iteration. Therefore, the update equations for the dual variables in the (i + 1)th iteration can be expressed as
where ξ λ (i) (j), ξ β (i) (j), and ξ μ (i) (j) are positive step sizes. According to these derivations, a subgradient method-based iteration algorithm is presented to solve (69), as shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Subgradient method-based iteration algorithm for the outer loop optimization 1: Set the iteration index i = 1. Initialize the Lagrange multiplier λ (i) , β (i) , μ (i) , the step size ξ λ , ξ β , ξ μ , the maximum number of iterations I max and the iteration threshold δ.
which can be expressed as
break out; 9: end if 10: i = i + 1; 11: end for 12: return C
To solve (76), rewrite (67) with given Lagrange multiplier λ (i) , β (i) , μ (i) as
It is obvious that g(C n , C E n ) is a closed proper convex function and f (C n , C E n ) is differentiable. Therefore, the proximal gradient method can be used to solve (76) according to the proximal theory. The proximal operator of f (C n , C E n ) is calculated as
The partial derivatives of f (C n , C E n ) with respect to C n , C E n are given by
where x(·) and y(·) represent the right and left Perron-Frobenius eigenvalues, respectively. It obvious that problem (76) is convex because it is a dual problem [25] . Due to the proximal gradient method, the proximal operator of (76) has a fixed point, which is also the optimal value of (76). Therefore, an iterative algorithm is proposed to find the fixed point, as shown in Algorithm 2. In fact, Algorithms 1 and 2 are the outer and inner loops, respectively. On each subcarrier, Algorithm 1 is executed to solve the equivalent convex optimization problem of D2D underlaying HetNets, whereas Algorithm 2 is utilized to solve the dual problem proposed in Algorithm 1.
The complexity of the proposed algorithm is analyzed as follows.
• The complexity of the subcarrier-allocation scheme is linear with O (N (H + LM + LK) ). Therefore, the total complexity of the proposed algorithm is O(N J 2 (H + LM + LK)), and the algorithm proposed in this paper considers both subcarrier-and power-allocation schemes at the expense of complexity. Due to including subcarrier-and power-allocation executions, the proposed algorithm in this paper can be solved in polynomial time and is acceptable in practice.
Algorithm 2
The dual problem solution for the inner loop Here, the secrecy capacity performance of the D2D communication underlaying HetNets and the corresponding optimization results are numerically evaluated with simulations. In our simulations, one HPN is concerned, and all LPNs are uniformly located in the circle with the distance of 1000 m whose center is the HPN. The cell radii of HPN and LPN are 800 and 200 m, respectively. The minimum allowed distance between HPN and users is 50 m, and the minimum allowed distance between LPN and users is 20 m to protect users from radiation. It is assumed that H = 2, i.e., there are two HUEs who access the HPN. It is assumed that M = 5 and K = 5, which suggest that five LUEs The total transmit power of HPN is 43 dBm and equally allocated on all subcarriers. The transmit power of the transmitter of DUE is 15 dBm, and the distance between the transmitter and the receiver is 10 m. It is assumed that the pathloss model is expressed as 31.5 + 40.0 * log 10 (d) for the D2D link and the LPN-to-LUE, LPN-D2D, and D2D-LUE links with short transmit distance, whereas 31.5 + 35.0 * log 10 (d) is used for other long links, where d denotes the distance between the transmitter and the receiver in meters. The number of simulation snapshots is set at 1000. In all snapshots, the fast-fading coefficients are all generated as independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Rayleigh random variables with unit variances.
A. Convergence of the Proposed Algorithm
To evaluate the convergence performance of the algorithm under more users, we set H = 10, N = 20, M = 15, and K = 15, respectively. The convergence of the proposed algorithm with different QoS requirements is shown in Fig. 2 . It is obviously shown that the proposed algorithm converges within five iteration numbers for different QoS requirements, which suggests that the proposed algorithm can work efficiently. In addition, the different levels of QoS requirements have significant impacts on the performance of the secrecy capacity. To evaluate the influence of the QoS requirements, three QoS levels are set and the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs is set at 24 dBm. Fig. 2 shows that the secrecy capacity of the system decreases with the QoS requirement increase. In the case of high QoS requirement, more transmit power should be allocated to the user who is unable to achieve the QoS requirement; thus, the system performance has a decrease. Therefore, there exists a balance between the system performance and the user performance. 
B. Secure Capacity Performances of the Proposed Solutions
Here, key factors impacting on the secrecy capacity performances of the proposed algorithm are evaluated. Since the transmit power constraint and the QoS requirement are two main constraints in the proposed optimization problem, the impact of these two factors is evaluated in Figs. 3 and 4 , respectively. In addition, the average secrecy capacity per UE is more significant than the total secrecy capacity to evaluate the performance of the D2D underlaying HetNets when the number of UEs changes frequently. Therefore, to evaluate the impact of the number of UEs to the D2D underlaying HetNets, the relationship between the number of UEs and the average secrecy capacity per UE should be evaluated. Since LUEs usually contribute more capacity to the network than HUEs and DUEs, without loss of generality, only the relationship between the number of LUEs per LPN and the average secrecy capacity per LUE is evaluated here, and the corresponding simulation result is shown in Fig. 5 . It should be noted that, in HetNets, HPNs are mainly deployed to provide seamless coverage, and LPNs, which are closer to users, are deployed in hot spots to provide high capacity. Therefore, the capacity of the network is mainly determined by LPNs, and only the maximum transmit power allowance of LPN is simulated in this paper.
In Fig. 3 , the secrecy capacity performances under varied QoS requirements with a step size of 0.02 are compared among different maximum allowed transmit power values. When the QoS requirement is not sufficiently large, the secrecy performance slowly decreases with the increasing QoS requirement because most users can set a sufficiently high transmit power to satisfy its QoS requirement. However, when the QoS requirement becomes large enough, more users can afford the QoS requirement, and then, more transmit power has to be allocated to these users to meet the QoS requirement. Furthermore, it is shown in Fig. 3 that, with the larger maximum allowed transmit power of LPN, the secrecy capacity performance increases, which has a similar trend with Fig. 4 .
To further evaluate the impact of the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs on the secure capacity performances, four baselines are presented. The first baseline is the upper bound of this problem, and it is calculated by the exhaustive method. We do the power-allocation algorithm for each possible subcarrier-allocation scheme and get the optimal subcarrier and power allocation for the problem. The second baseline is proposed in [3] . In [3] , users that cause severe interference are scheduled to the other subcarriers to alleviate interference. For example, if user A interferes other users seriously on the ith subcarrier, it can be scheduled to the jth subcarrier, on which the interference can be almost avoided. The third baseline is based on the classic orthogonal subcarrier allocation that has been widely used in HetNets. The fourth baseline is based on the fixed power scheme, i.e., the transmit power allocated to LUEs is same and fixed. Fig. 4 compares the secure capacity performance of different algorithms in terms of maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs. In this simulation case, the QoS requirement is set at 0, and the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs varies within [14 dBm, 36 dBm] with the step size of 2 dBm. Fig. 4 shows that when the transmit power is not sufficiently high, the secure capacity performance increases with the transmit power increase because the interference is still not the bottleneck and the increment of secure capacity mainly depends on increasing transmit power. However, when the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs is sufficiently high, the interference limits the increase in the secure capacity. Thus, no more transmit power is allocated to users. As shown in Fig. 4 , the proposed algorithm is closed to the upper bound and outperforms the algorithm presented in [3] because the reference [3] just proposed some mechanisms to mitigate the influence of interference. In addition, the algorithm presented in [3] is better than the orthogonal subcarrier allocation due to the benefit of frequency reuse. Furthermore, the fixed power scheme has the worst performance because it takes no measures to optimize the secure capacity performance of the whole system. Fig. 5 shows the relationship between the number of LUEs and the average secrecy capacity per LUE to evaluate the impact of the number of UEs to the whole network. In this simulation case, the QoS requirement is set at 0.1 bit/s/Hz and the maximum allowed transmit power of LPNs varies from 18 to 22 dBm with a step size of 2 dBm. The minimum number of LUEs per LPN is set to 1. Since the number of subcarriers is set to eight, which suggests that, at most, eight LUEs can simultaneously connect to the LPN in each time slot in each LPN, the maximum number of LUEs per LPN is set to eight. It is shown in Fig. 5 that as the number of LUEs per LPN increases, the average secrecy capacity per LUE decreases because the intratier interference increases with more LUEs connecting to the same LPN. The augmentation of intratier interference leads to the abatement of average secrecy capacity per LUE. However, it can be calculated from Fig. 5 that the total secrecy capacity of the whole LUEs keeps increasing as the number of LUEs per LPN rises because when more LUEs connect to the LPN, more subcarriers can be allocated to these LUEs until the number of LUEs is equal to the number of the subcarriers. In addition, Fig. 5 shows that the higher the maximum transmit power allowance of LPN, the better the secrecy capacity of the whole network will be, which has the same trend, as shown in Fig. 3 .
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the secrecy-optimized resource allocation for the D2D communication underlaying HetNets has been researched. In the concerned system model, there densely exist HPN and LPN with D2D communication; therefore, the intertier interference is always severe, which leads to the secrecyoptimized maximization problem being nonconvex. To solve this nonconvex optimization problem, the primal nonconvex optimization problem has been transformed into the convex issue with several steps. First, the objective function with several constraints is transformed into a matrix form. Second, the equivalent convex form of the maximization problem for the matrix form is derived according to the Perron-Frobenius theory. Third, the proximal operator of the transformed convex problem is evaluated. Then, a novel iterative algorithm based on the proximal theory to solve the equivalent convex problem is proposed.
Simulation results have demonstrated that the secrecy capacity has a significant improvement and the proposed algorithm is effective and converges fast. Furthermore, compared with four baselines, the proposal has a significant performance gain on the secrecy capacity of the whole network. In the future, the nonideal CSIs should be considered to optimize the secrecy capacity. In addition, the advanced intertier interference in the physical layer and the dynamical queue characteristics in the upper layer should be jointly considered with the radio resource allocation to optimize the secrecy capacity in the D2D communication underlying HetNets.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Without loss of generality, let x p denote the optimal x. Thus, it can be derived as
Assume that there exists x j = x * , which is better than x i . Therefore, the following equation holds:
which means that
It is obvious that (88) conflicts with (86). Thus, x p is the optimal x and Theorem 1 holds.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
According to (46), it can be derived that e (C n ) j − 1 = (S n ) j = p nj /(F n p n + v n ) j , which is the same as diag(e C n ) − I (F n p n + v n ) = p n .
Substituting (55) into (89), it can be derived as diag(e C n )q n = p n + q n .
Multiplying both sides of (90) by B nj , which is given by (53), we can have F n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j diag(e C n )q n = F n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j p n + F n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j q n (91)
According to (52), α T j p n ≤ (p max ) j . Thus 1 (p max ) j v n α T j p n = v n α T j p n (p max ) j ≤ v n (93) F n p n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j p n + F n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j q n ≤ F n p n + v n + F n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j q n (94) = q n + F n + 1 (p max ) j v n α T j q n (95)
where (95) is derived by (55). Now, the formula can be derived as
Substituting (53) into this inequality, (57) can be derived. Similarly, (58) can be derived according to (54) and (56).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Since (I+B nj ) −1 exists, multiply both sides of constraint(61) by (I+B nj ) −1 , and the following equation can be derived as B nj diag(e C n )q n ≤ (I + B nj )q n ⇔ (I + B nj ) −1 B nj diag(e C n )q n ≤ q n ⇔B nj diag(e C n )q n ≤ q n .
(98)
According to the subinvariance theorem [26] , if a nonnegative matrix A, a positive number a, and a nonnegative vector v satisfy Av ≤ av, then ρ(A) ≤ a, and the equality holds if and only if Av = av. Let A =B nj diag(e C n ), a = 1, and v = q n and rewrite (61) as ρ(B nj diag(e C n )) ≤ 1, which is the same as log(ρ(B nj diag(e C n ))) ≤ 0. Similarly, it can be derived that log(ρ(B E nj diag(e C E n ))) ≤ 0. 
